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human activities may correlate with 
the probability of pathogen introduc-
tion through introduced species (6), 
fomites, or other sources of infectious 
particles, with the likelihood of in-
troduction higher for ranavirus. Cer-
tainly, both pathogens are presumed to 
be vectored in association with human 
activities (7,8), but B. dendrobatidis 
exhibits a greater host and geographic 
range and thus should exhibit greater 
prevalence if humans were mediating 
introduction across the range of our 
study. Second, human activities such 
as construction and industry, may di-
rectly or indirectly inﬂ  uence the basic 
reproductive number, R0, of ranavirus 
to a greater extent than for that of B. 
dendrobatidis. Although ranavirus 
does exhibit optimal environmental 
ranges for replication and infection, 
the virulence of B. dendrobatidis can 
be directly inﬂ  uenced by the environ-
ment (2). Furthermore, infection by B. 
dendrobatidis occurs through a free-
living stage; ranavirus is more likely 
transmitted through direct contact, 
which suggests that B. dendrobatidis 
would be more sensitive to environ-
mental factors. Last, human activities 
may inﬂ  uence host ability to mediate 
immune responses that have the capa-
bility to prevent infection. Evidence 
exists that amphibian host responses 
to ranavirus are predominantly ac-
quired (9); those for B. dendrobatidis 
may be more innate and less prone 
to environmental manipulation (10). 
Although the observed correlation 
should be further tested and the distur-
bance index should be reﬁ  ned, we be-
lieve our observed pattern may reﬂ  ect 
the inﬂ  uence of human activities and 
habitat modiﬁ   cation in the dispersal 
of infectious diseases. With increas-
ing evidence pointing towards the 
role of emerging infectious diseases in 
the decline of amphibian populations, 
management plans should therefore 
account for the indirect effects related 
to human activities. 
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Avian Inﬂ  uenza 
Virus (H5N1) 
Mortality 
Surveillance 
To the Editor: The highly patho-
genic strain of avian inﬂ  uenza  virus 
subtype H5N1 presents a major chal-
lenge to global public health systems. 
Currently, inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infection 
is a zoonosis with a 60% case-fatality 
rate for affected persons over 3 conti-
nents; the virus could mutate to become 
directly transmissible among humans 
(1). This potential for pandemic trans-
mission must be reduced through early 
detection of transmission foci, followed 
by rapid implementation of control 
measures (2). In the following analysis, 
we demonstrate that single carcasses 
of birds, mostly found by members of 
the public, were the primary indica-
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tors for avian inﬂ  uenza virus activity in 
Sweden and Denmark in 2006. 
Inﬂ   uenza virus (H5N1) is am-
pliﬁ  ed by commercial and backyard 
poultry and free-ranging birds. Wheth-
er captive birds (e.g., poultry) or wild 
birds are responsible for the spread of 
the virus remains a matter of debate 
(3). Initial spread from Southeast Asia 
before 2005 was likely the result of 
transport of infected poultry because 
the spread was not easily explained by 
natural bird movements (4,5). Howev-
er, its spread to Western Europe in late 
2005 could be explained by weather-
induced migration of waterfowl after 
a freeze in Eastern Europe (6,7). Since 
spreading to Sweden and Denmark in 
early 2006, the virus has been detected 
there in dead birds of numerous spe-
cies (Table). Detections in carcasses 
of primarily free-ranging birds have 
become the principal means of track-
ing spread of the virus in Europe.
To better understand how avian 
mortality surveillance could be reﬁ  ned 
for monitoring the spread of inﬂ  uenza 
virus (H5N1), we analyzed the weekly 
ofﬁ  cial reports of such detections in 
Sweden and Denmark in 2006 (8). 
Virus surveillance in both countries 
includes both active cloacal swabbing 
of free-ranging wild birds and passive 
collection of tracheal swabs from bird 
carcasses. For the analysis, all car-
casses of a single species collected 
on 1 day within a single locality con-
stituted 1 record. For each record, we 
evaluated whether the carcasses were 
reported by a member of the public 
versus a civil servant, the number of 
carcasses tested, and the number of 
positive detections.
Our analysis evaluated 44 records; 
a total of 70 birds, of 14 species, tested 
positive for the virus in 22 localities 
of Sweden and Denmark. Almost all 
of these records (n>40, 91%) referred 
to dead birds found by members of 
the public rather than civil servants. 
A smaller portion than expected were 
Anseriformes (i.e., ducks, geese, or 
swans; n = 32, 73%). Other orders of 
birds represented were Falconiformes 
(hawks, falcons; n = 8, 18%), Strigi-
formes (owls; n = 2, 5%), Podicepidi-
formes (grebes; n = 1, 2%), and Char-
adriiformes (gulls, shorebirds; n = 1, 
2%). In addition, birds of other orders 
tested positive in Denmark but were 
excluded from the analysis for lack of 
supporting data. Most (75%) of the re-
cords referred to singleton carcasses; 
the remaining 25% represented mul-
tiple detections, ranging from 2 to 9 
individual birds of a single species. 
A majority (73%) of inﬂ  uenza virus 
(H5N1)–positive localities hosted 
solely singleton carcasses, whereas the 
other 27% hosted multiple dead birds. 
No virus activity was detected through 
active free-ranging bird surveillance, 
even though 9,260 live birds were 
captured and sampled during 2006 in 
Sweden and Denmark.
The pattern of virus activity ob-
served in Sweden and Denmark was un-
expected. Rather than die-offs of large 
numbers of waterfowl during winter 
when they congregate, small numbers 
(mainly singleton birds) were affected 
late in winter, just before spring migra-
tion. During the spring breeding sea-
son, less transmission was observed. 
The predictive power of detecting the 
virus in free-ranging migratory birds 
for forecasting poultry outbreaks or 
human disease remains undetermined. 
Some of these birds may have been in-
fected in areas remote from the site of 
detection. However, several of the af-
fected birds in this report were either 
resident nonmigratory species (eagle 
owl, Eurasian magpie) or captive do-
mesticated species (muscovy, peafowl, 
chicken), which indicates local trans-
mission. Health authorities will be bet-
ter prepared to prospectively minimize 
transmission in new regions with early 
warning provided by singleton carcass 
surveillance.
Surveillance results from Sweden 
and Denmark highlight the impor-
tance of public participation in avian 
mortality surveillance for inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus (H5N1); the preponderance of de-
tections from singleton carcasses; and 
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Table. Bird species testing positive for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype 
H5N1, Sweden and Denmark, 2006* 
No. carcasses positive
Avian order and species  Scientific name  Sweden Denmark
Podicepidiformes (great crested grebe)  Podiceps cristatus 01
Anseriformes 
 Mute  swan  Cygnus olor 24
 Whooper  swan  Cygnus cygnus 03
 Greylag  goose  Anser anser 01
 Goose  spp  Anser spp. 10
 Muscovy  duck  Cairina moschata 02
 Mallard  Anas platyrhynchos 10
 Greater  scaup  Aythya marila 30
 Tufted  duck  Aythya fuligula 25 26
 Common  merganser  Mergus merganser 20
 Smew  Mergus albellus 10
Falconiformes
 Common  buzzard  Buteo buteo 16
 Rough-legged  hawk  Buteo lagopus 01
 Peregrine  falcon  Falco peregrinus 01
Galliformes 
 Common  peafowl  Pavo cristatus 01
 Domestic  chicken  Gallus gallus 01
Charadriiformes (herring gull)  Larus argentatus 10
Strigiformes (eagle owl)  Bubo bubo 20
Passeriformes (Eurasian magpie)  Pica pica 01
All birds  39 48
*Sources: (6,7). LETTERS
the broad spectrum of affected spe-
cies, particularly raptors. A raptor was 
the index case in Denmark (7). Cur-
rent surveillance efforts in regions free 
from the virus favor investigation of 
signiﬁ  cant death events of waterfowl 
and active sampling of healthy water-
fowl as the means for early detection 
(e.g., 9). Many national surveillance 
programs are heavily inﬂ  uenced  by 
the inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) outbreak in 
2005 at Qinghai Lake in China, where 
hundreds of geese, gulls, and cormo-
rants died during the breeding season 
(10). However, large die-offs may be 
anomalous or restricted to communal 
breeding sites of waterfowl where ju-
venile birds amplify and spread the vi-
rus within the breeding colony. Testing 
of public-reported singleton carcasses 
provides a more sensitive and robust 
means of early detection of this virus.  
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Klebsiella 
pneumoniae 
Carbapenemase–2, 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina
To the Editor: The activity of 
carbapenem has been compromised 
because of the emergence of carbap-
enemases (1). Since 1995, carbapenem 
resistance has been identiﬁ  ed among 
77 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates and 
1 Citrobacter freundii clinical isolate 
in Argentina (WHONET-Argentina 
Network). However, until now, none 
had produced a carbapenemase.
K. pneumoniae carbapenemase-1 
(KPC-1) was ﬁ   rst detected in a K. 
pneumoniae strain isolated in North 
Carolina in 2001 (1). Since that time, 
several reports of KPCs worldwide 
have been made, including in South 
America (1). We report on KPC-2
–producing K. pneumoniae and C. fre-
undii clinical isolates in Argentina.
A 36-year-old woman with sys-
temic lupus erythematosus and chron-
ic renal failure was admitted to the 
Sanatorio Mitre in Buenos Aires in 
September 2006 for a kidney trans-
plant. Two months after the transplant, 
intraabdominal collection obtained 
during a surgical procedure yielded a 
carbapenem-susceptible  Escherichia 
coli isolate, after which meropenem 
therapy was initiated (1 g/day). After 
16 days of treatment, an infection de-
veloped at the patient’s surgical site 
(per US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention criteria, available from 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/guide
lines/SSI.pdf).  C. freundii M9169 
and K. pneumoniae M9171 were both 
isolated from the same specimen ob-
tained from the surgical site. Because 
carbapenemase production was sus-
pected, carbapenem treatment was 
stopped, and the infection was treated 
with local antiseptic and drainage for 
20 days; the patient was discharged 
from the hospital in January 2007. 
Neither the patient nor her relatives or 
hospital staff had been in the United 
States before the emergence of these 
strains.
By using disk diffusion (2) (Mu-
eller-Hinton agar and disks obtained 
from Difco and BBL, respectively; 
Becton, Dickinson and Co., Frank-
lin Lakes, NJ, USA), we determined 
that K. pneumoniae M9171 was resis-
tant to all antimicrobial drugs except 
amikacin, tetracycline (3), and tigecy-
cline (US Federal Drug Administra-
tion criteria, susceptible >19 mm ). C. 
freundii M9169 remained susceptible 
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